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SYMPOSIUM
The Epidemiology of Critique
RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL*

A decade and a half ago, I experienced my proverbial fifteen min-

utes of fame when Some Realism About CriticalLegal Studies appeared
in these pages.'

That certainly wasn't the plan. In much the same sense that "all
politics is local," all legal scholarship is surely local as well, and in its
conception Some Realism was as local as could be. Written at the height
of the critical legal studies (cls) "Red scare" of the mid-1980s - and
designed to reach an audience of Miami law faculty and alums who were
still much in the thrall of the late, great Dean Soia Mentschikoff - the
article emphasized the intellectual roots of cls in American Legal Realism and thus represented an effort to make the community a bit more
comfortable with then-recent (and highly exaggerated) reports that "the
crits" were taking over the school.2
Although the primary point of the piece was that legal reasoning
could frequently justify more than one outcome in a particular case and, my, how quaint the indeterminacy debate seems these days - it was
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. Special thanks to Pat Gudridge and Jeremy Paul
for exceptionally insightful readings of an earlier draft; to Jennifer Christianson, Jason Kairalla,
and the rest of the Volume 56 Executive Board of the University of Miami Law Review for their
faith in this Symposium; and to Michael Huber, the incoming Editor-in-Chief, whose patience and
professionalism made a successful completion of the project possible.
1. Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About CriticalLegal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
505 (1987).
2. See, e.g., WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1986, at 5A (listing Miami among several law schools
where cls purportedly had a "sizeable influence"); Noreen Marcus, Law's New Wave: Critical
Legal Studies Comes to UM, MIAMI REV., Sept. 29, 1986, at 1. On the cls "Red scare" more
generally, see Jerry Frug, McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
665 (1987) (book review).
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my effort to impersonate Robert Hale that created the stir. Drawing
upon Hale's work exploring the hidden politics of American private
law,3 I posed a hypothetical I had developed to spur critical thinking and
debate in my labor law class: What would the world be like if the law

granted labor rather than capital the legal entitlement to the fruits of the
joint enterprise - naturally, it was the ownership of a "widget" that was

at stake - and labor paid capital a "wage" for the latter's input in commodity production?4
In retrospect, I may have overestimated the comfort level of my
intended audience with Realist-style critique, or perhaps comforting
3. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
603 (1943).
4. Fischl, supra note 1, at 527. In its entirety, the passage read thus:
Near the beginning of my course on labor law, I engage my students in the
following dialogue: Picture an employee who works for a company that produces
widgets. One working day, this employee builds four widgets and, at the end of that
day, tenders to her boss an amount in cash equal to the cost of the necessary
materials and their procurement, the reasonable rental value of her workspace and
tools, and the apportioned cost of other managerial expenses. She then leaves the
shop and takes the widgets with her, planning to sell them and keep the profit.
What, I ask, will happen?
My students stir restlessly until someone volunteers that the employer will sue
the employee, or have her arrested. On what theories, I respond. Someone hazards
the guess that the employee has committed the tort of conversion or the crime of
theft. I then ask why the employer is not guilty of the same misconduct when he
pays the employee a reasonable "rent" for her labor, keeps the widgets for himself,
and sells them for his own profit. There is more stirring and murmuring, until
someone finally says, "Because the widgets belong to the employer - the law says
that they're his property."
Why should that be, I ask. After all, there is nothing "necessary" about
permitting the employer to "rent" the worker and keep the widgets; why not
structure the relationship the other way around? When someone objects that, if we
did that, "then we wouldn't have capitalism," I reply that that's exactly my point.
The law reflects and enforces a core assumption about the relationship between
employer and employee in a market economy: the employee's legally protected
interest in the job is limited to his wage, while the employer is accorded the
exclusive right to both the widgets and the profits to be earned from their sale. ...
To cls, the decision to give legal sanction to (and hence to enforce by state
coercion) this or any distribution of legal entitlements reflects assumptions that
should not be immune to re-examination and critique. We might want to consider
the current arrangement in light of our democratic and egalitarian aspirations and
ask whether it exacts too great a cost in terms of the self-determination and the
bargaining power of working people. Or we might conclude that employer
ownership provides advantages in terms of investment incentives and transaction
efficiencies, and therefore decide that we prefer to leave things the way they are.
The point is that the current distribution is a choice - not a "natural" or "necessary"
phenomenon. It only seems "natural" because of our habit of treating the initial
distribution of legal entitlements as a "private" law issue, which obscures the fact
that this arrangement is wholly a matter of political choice. A major aim of cls,
then, is to open up such subjects to democratic examination and debate.
Id. at 527-28 (footnote omitted; italics in original).

2003]

THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF CRITIQUE

skeptical alums and senior colleagues was not what I was up to after all.
But not in my wildest dreams did I imagine the attention that the "widget hypothetical" would eventually receive and the reaction that it would
provoke.
As I would later learn, the trouble began when a reporter from
The New York Times interviewed Derrick Bell - then a member of the
Harvard Law faculty - about the failure of several scholars associated
with cls to secure tenure at Harvard, and Professor Bell urged the
reporter to read Some Realism (among other things) in order to get a feel
for the ideas associated with cls.5 The reporter evidently did her homework, and she and her editors eventually decided to run an excerpt from
my article in connection with the Harvard story. I caught wind of this
when she called to verify my name, rank, and institutional affiliation, but
when I actually saw the piece - in the Sunday "Week in Review," no
less - I was stunned to discover that the "widget hypothetical" was
reprinted virtually in its entirety as a sidebar with the caption, "What the
Fuss is About."6
Fuss indeed. For better or for worse, one of the consequences of
having your scholarship appear in the Sunday Times - rather than in the
usual places - is that people actually read it and respond to it, and
respond to it they did. I heard from academics working in a wide variety
of fields (including economics, philosophy, business, and life sciences)
and from a fair number of regular folks as well - most in both groups
bearing the unsettling news that my quote had convinced them that everything they had suspected all along about cls was pretty much spot-on.
In the meantime, a law and business newspaper in Miami ran a brief
story comparing my moment in the sun to that of Gary Hart's thenrecent sailing partner, and that brought a second wave of incoming mail,
local and equally unflattering. 7
To be sure, some of my correspondents were more generous than
others, and none was more gracious than Guido Calabresi, then a civilian and dean at Yale, who saw the Times piece and wrote a charming
letter requesting a reprint of the article.8 A cordial correspondence
ensued, but things got a little touchy during an exchange about the strik5. Letter from Derrick Bell, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Richard Michael
Fischl, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law 1 (Aug. 31, 1987) (on file with

author). Professor Bell now teaches at New York University School of Law, and that's a story in
itself.
6. Jennifer A. Kingson, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts 'Critical Legal Studies' on Trial, N.Y.
Aug. 30, 1987, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 6.
7. See Mary Anne McAdams, UM Law Professor Excerpted by New York Times, MIAMI
REV., Sept. 4, 1987, at 1I. As Miami humorist Dave Barry might put it, I am not making this
citation up.
8. Letter from Guido Calabresi, Dean, Yale Law School, to Richard Michael Fischl,
TIMES,

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:475

ing absence of scholars associated with cls at his law school. There is a
none-too-pretty story there - I was vaguely familiar with that story, and
Dean Calabresi may have suspected as much - but, demonstrating my
best company manners, I confined myself to noting the irony of that
absence given Yale's historical association with Legal Realism.9 His
response, which cut to both the chase and the quick, was that "those with
Cow Pox don't get Small Pox."" °
As I cleared the decks to begin drafting this Introduction, that
remark was very much on my mind. To be sure, small-pox jokes
seemed funnier back then - as did so many things - and in any event
credit must go to Duncan Kennedy for developing and popularizing the
legal-theory-as-virus metaphor in connection with the critical tradition in
American law.'' But the epidemiology of critique suggested by Dean
Calabresi's bon mot stirred in my imagination as I read my way through
some earlier assessments of Pierre Schlag's scholarship and the two
dozen contributions to this Symposium. For much like a virus, Pierre's
work seems to produce patterned symptoms among many of those who
encounter it (e.g., irritable scholar syndrome and a compulsion to ask,
with increasing impatience, for directions); in other cases to mutate into
harmless conformity with the predispositions of the host ("we're all
deconstructionists now"); to encounter hearty resistance in certain populations (one can almost picture the antibodies swarming his texts); and to
reproduce itself endlessly in still others (all together now: authority!
experience! tradition! perception! custom! convention! faith! emotion!
and so on!).
To be sure, these strong reactions will come as no surprise to those
familiar with the scholarship in question, which contests some of the
most cherished practices and beliefs of the legal academy. According to
Pierre, our obsession with normative questions ("What should be done?
How should we live? What should the law be?") undermines our capacity to comprehend the law that already is and our decidedly humble (if
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law I (Sept. 4, 1987) (on file with author).
Dean Calabresi is now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

9. On the historical association, see

LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:

1927-1960

(1986); on the none-to-pretty story, see Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A PoliticalHistory,
100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1530-34 (1991).
10. Letter from Guido Calabresi, Dean, Yale Law School, to Richard Michael Fischl,
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law I (Sept. 28, 1987) (on file with author).

11.See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIPCLE} 73 (1997)
(describing the critical tradition of legal realism and cls as a "'viral' strain" in American legal
thought); see generally Critical Legal Studies (Debut de Sicle): A Symposium on Duncan
Kennedy's Critique of Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 701-1189 (2001).
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not entirely innocent) role in its operation, 12 and our efforts to represent
law (or at least the law we like) as reason's fairest child are self-delusions at best and apologies for power's dominion at worst.' 3 Such
claims are obviously not likely to go over well among legal academics,
and often they haven't.' 4 Taken together, they challenge what might be
described as the "authority-fetishism" of the mainstream American jurisprudential tradition: the seemingly relentless quest for that special something (legal science, situation sense, policy analysis, reasoned
elaboration, rights, principles-not-policies, wealth maximization, etc.)
that will turn a debatable "ought" into a transcendent and incontrovertible "is" and thus remove the author (that would be us) from the picture.
In Pierre's apt phrase, it's law as a continuation of God by other means
...and pay no attention to that really busy guy behind the curtain.' 5
The challenge to authority-fetishism fares better in this crowd, and
- if I may be permitted another deployment of the viral metaphor - the
reason may be that many of the contributors have found a refuge of sorts
in "inoculation." Thus, Pierre's claims may well produce milder reactions among scholars whose work is associated with various schools of
critical legal thought - cls, radical legal feminism, critical race theory,
left-postmodernism etc. - that have long viewed reason and much of
legal normativity as profoundly implicated in various forms of invidious
social and institutional hierarchy. To be sure, those who struggle to
reconstruct reason and normativity in order to avoid the pitfalls identified by critical theory - those who would, in other words, reconfigure
authority in a kinder and gentler image - are likely to resist and perhaps
even resent Pierre's argument that the reconstructive enterprise is far
more likely to replicate than to remedy those errors. But those who have
16
given up the search for "the voice of the father, the holy word of law"'
are likely to be more receptive to his claims, more likely to view his
challenges to reason and legal normativity as a useful adjunct to their
own. And those who have given up that search because they think the
search is the problem may well conclude that Pierre's challenge to
authority-fetishism is pretty much spot-on.

12. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 29 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
13. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998).

14. For some particularly virulent reactions - and a fascinating account of what may produce
them - see Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the Legal Closet, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 791 (2003).
15. Pierre Schlag, Law as a Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427

(1997).
16. Goodrich, supra note 14, at 814.
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My sympathies lie with the latter view - "the search is the problem" was the principal point of The Question That Killed Critical Legal
Studies17 - and it isn't hard to fathom from whence my own particular

inoculation came. For one thing, I was raised in the Baltimore Catechism era (i.e., pre-Vatican II) Catholic Church of no-meat-on-Fridays,
no - food - for - three - hours - and - no - drink-for- one - before - Communion,

mandatory-Mass-on-Sundays, Gregorian-chant-and-prayers-at-the-footof-the-altar, saving-pagan-babies fame. When it comes to breeding
resistance to the claims of authority, the Church was surely the Mother
of All Cow-pox for those of a certain age who are more likely to take
aim at "the holy word" than to celebrate it, let alone set out to actually
look for it.

If the Catholic Church is the unwitting Mother of resistance, at least
in my own case American labor law may well be the Father, for work in
my primary field of study has an amazing way of putting authority - and
especially the law's authority - in its place. The Labor Relations and
Employment Law Section program at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools a few years back is revealing in this
connection. The topic was "New Approaches to Organizing," and the
speakers included the chief counsel to the Chair of the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"); a union president and a professional labor organizer; and several prominent labor law scholars.' 8
In a presentation that turned out to be a fitting metaphor for the
relationship between labor and law at the turn of the century, the NLRB
representative spoke of several then-recent Board decisions in the
organizing area, and the rest of the panelists basically ignored everything he said.' 9 The labor organizer, for her part, gave an inspiring
account of the Los Angeles Justice for Janitors campaign, an effort to
unionize thousands of custodial workers who clean office buildings in
L.A. The campaign she described completely avoided the process estab17. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SoC.
779 (1992); see also Richard Michael Fischl, Privileged Positions, 17 LAW & Soc.

INQUIRY

INQUIRY

831 (1992).

18. "New Approaches to Organizing" panel, AALS Annual Meeting, Labor Relations and

Employment Law Section session (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter Labor Section session] (tape on file
with author).

19. Presentation of William R. Stewart, Chief Counsel to NLRB Chair William B. Gould IV,
Labor Section session, supra note 18. To be sure, participants on academic panels are frequently

guilty of listening only to themselves, but what made the treatment of the NLRB representative
stand out was that the panelists in this session were otherwise uncommonly interactive. No doubt
I was especially sensitive to the dynamics because I had had the extraordinary good fortune of
working for Bill Stewart during the late 1970s and early 1980s at the NLRB. Bill handled the
awkward encounter with his usual wry humor, observing that he had initially been happy to
appear on the panel "because I thought I was going to be with friends." Id. (emphasis audible in

original).
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lished by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), under which those
desiring union representation seek an NLRB-conducted secret-ballot
election and, if a majority of those voting favor representation, the union
secures bargaining rights via an order from the NLRB. By contrast, the
Justice for Janitors drive ignored the Board and even ignored the maintenance contractors that actually employed the janitors. Instead, the union
mounted a campaign of publicity, parades, and mass demonstrations
designed to bring pressure to bear on the corporate and professional
tenants, owners, and financiers of the office buildings in which the janitors worked. The protest activities were also designed to persuade the
public of the justice of the union's cause and eventually resulted in a
collective-bargaining agreement guaranteeing higher wages and firsttime health-care benefits for more than 90% of the custodial workers in
20
the city.
With a nod toward her audience of law professors, the speaker
struggled visibly to address the role of law in the campaign: "I tried to
think of something really kind of related to law," she confessed. "Other
than keeping us out of jail, there wasn't much we did with lawyers. '"21
When their turn came, the academics made the point even more explicitly, one of them arguing that the NLRA is "just irrelevant" in today's
world of work22 and a second pointing out that American labor's greatest successes - both historically and today - have almost invariably been
the result of violating rather than following the law.2 3
The panel was not exactly in awe of the law, then, and the reasons
for their views are obvious enough to those familiar with the recent his20. Presentation of Cecile Richards, professional organizer for the Service Employees
International Union, Labor Section session, supra note 18. An insightful and comprehensive
account of the campaign is available in Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of
Immigrant Janitors in Southern California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in

ORGANIZING

199 (Ruth Milkman
ed., 2000). For a fictional but realistic and moving portrayal of an effort to organize an office
building not covered by the original agreement, see (indeed, be sure to see) BREAD AND ROSES
(Lion's Gate Films 2001) (U.S. release).
21. Presentation of Cecile Richards, supra note 20. To the same effect, see Labor Section
session, supra note 18 (presentation of Donene Williams, President, Harvard Union of Clerical
and Technical Workers):
I tried to also think of a point to bring it around to lawyers, and it's this: We don't
use 'em. We don't use 'em in our grievance procedure, which we don't even call a
grievance procedure, we call it a problem-solving process. . . . We don't use
lawyers in our contract negotiations. We do make sure that we're not breaking any
IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA

laws when we negotiate something, but for the most part ...we try not to use the
law as the basis for making decisions.
22. Presentation of Charles B. Craver, Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law,

George Washington University, Labor Section session, supra note 18.
23. Presentation of James Gray Pope, Professor of Law, Rutgers-Newark Law School, Labor
Section session, supra note 18.
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tory of the labor movement. For one thing, the provisions of the NLRA
that protect union organizing and collective bargaining have proven to
be increasingly ineffectual, while the provisions that limit labor's capacity to engage in self-help - most particularly the prohibitions against
secondary boycotts (e.g., picketing the target employer's principal sup-

plier) - have to a significant degree had their intended effect.2 4 Moreover, at the time of the panel, labor activists and academics were just
beginning to perceive what has since become the conventional wisdom
in our field: a confluence of developments - including the decline of
long-term, full-time employment and a corresponding increase in "contingent" work; the intensification of global competition in product markets; the increasing ability and willingness of employers to export work
to and import workers from low-wage markets; and the diminishing
capacity of individual nation-states to govern new and old capital forms
alike - is producing increasingly competitive labor markets that in turn

make the legal institutions and practices of an earlier era (in the words of
the panelist) "just irrelevant."2 5
Still, the relationship of American labor to American law is more
complex and nuanced than the snapshot offered by the speakers might
suggest. One presumes that "keeping [union organizers] out of jail"
involves some careful negotiation of legal terrain, especially in the context of a campaign like Justice for Janitors whose tactics (e.g., parades
and demonstrations targeting building owners and tenants) would have
to be staged very carefully in order to avoid that pesky prohibition
against secondary boycotts.2 6 It is one thing to decide to forgo recourse
24. One reason that the secondary boycott provisions have worked so well in comparison with
the protections for union organizing is the many NLRB and judicial interpretations watering down
the latter. See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983); Karl E. Klare, The JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). But the disparity is also the
product of a striking remedial asymmetry within the NLRA itself. Thus, when an employer
credibly charges a union with engaging in a secondary boycott, the Board is required by statute to
seek immediate injunctive relief, and the employer enjoys a private right of action against the
union for damages resulting from the boycott. By contrast, there is no private right of action for
damages - nor any requirement of immediate injunctive relief - when an employer fires an
employee for union organizing; instead, in the typical case a prevailing employee will wait threeto-four years to get (a) backpay less interim earnings and (b) an offer of reinstatement to a really
scary job. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW

243-52 (1990).

25. Presentation of Charles B. Craver, supra note 22. On the developments described in text,
see LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES
(Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002) and particularly the introductory chapters by Karl Klare and
the late Massimo d'Antona; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
26. The body of doctrine governing this area is much too complex - and much too beside the
point here - to be worth recounting, other than to say that it is the product of an intricate interplay
between statutory provisions prohibiting boycotts, a statutory proviso exempting "publicity other
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to an ineffectual law that is designed to help you, but another thing altogether to ignore a law when an injunction (and jail time, if the injunction
is likewise ignored) and a sizeable damages claim are the possible consequences. Indeed, as Jim Pope has eloquently argued for some time and he was the academic on the panel who urged unions to violate the
law - the American labor movement's legacy of law-breaking is not a
legacy of "law-breaking willy nilly."27 It is rather a legacy of the selective and strategic violation of laws and legal practices widely believed
by those in the movement to violate the Constitution - albeit the Constitution as imagined and aspired to by labor's denizens rather than as
interpreted by American courts.2 8
But labor's pro-law legacy is similarly complex: The provision that
may arguably represent American labor's greatest affirmative legal
accomplishment - section 7 of the original Wagner Act (now the
NLRA), which affords employees "the right to engage in... concerted
activities for the purpose of ...mutual aid or protection" 29 - is, after all,
a provision that offers protection for a kind of law-breaking that hits
much closer to home. What the provision protects is a series of activities that most employers would consider egregiously disloyal and (were
it not for the NLRA) grounds for immediate discharge: forming or joining a union; vigorously protesting an employer's decisions or policies;
striking and picketing in order to force the employer to meet the union's
demands. Not to put too fine a point on it, these activities amount to a
collective biting of the hand that feeds you and risk the considerable
wrath of the fist sans velvet glove. For a host of reasons, of course, the
provision doesn't protect such transgressive activities very effectively,
meaning that employers frequently can and do retaliate with legal impunity; accordingly, at the end of the day the protection that employees
actually enjoy depends more upon their solidarity and resolve - and the
support they receive from others - than on the provisions of the
NLRA.3 ° Engaging in such activities is thus a scary and difficult thing
than picketing" (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)), and a series of Supreme Court decisions limiting the
prohibition's scope in the name of free speech. For an insightful overview of the maze and its
underlying conceptual structures, see GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION
AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND

(1999).

27. Presentation of James Gray Pope, supra note 23.
28. Id.; for the unabridged version of the argument in text, see James Gray Pope, Labor's
Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941 (1997).
29. 29 U.S.C § 157 (2002).
30. To cite just one example of the risks involved - albeit a dramatic one - Paul Weiler
estimates that an employee was unlawfully discharged in one of every three representation
elections conducted by the NLRB during the 1980's. See Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions:
Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1019-24 (1991). Critics of his study
put the figure for 1980 at one in five, but concede that the ratio was close to one-in-three by the
latter half of that decade. See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions:
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to do, but engaging in these activities is exactly what labor activists do and labor's lawyers defend - every day.

Whatever else one might say about all of this, it certainly isn't anything remotely resembling authority-fetishism - except, I suppose, to the

extent that authority-phobia is a form of authority-fetishism - that gives
labor activists the courage to speak a subversive truth to employer

power.3 ' And while the invocation of constitutionalism in the service of
their law-breaking efforts bears some resemblance to the mainstream

American jurisprudential tradition referred to earlier - that relentless
quest for a special something that's bigger than the both of us (or bigger
than you, anyway) on which our self-serving claims can rest - the differ-

ence is that labor's "higher law" isn't a magic-bullet argument, a trumpcard principle, or a series of Supreme Court decisions (read this way),
but rather a collective sense of injustice growing out of the lived experience of workplace life and struggles.3 2
In labor's story, then, law is neither punchline nor promised land,
but is instead a part - and frequently a very important part - of a terrain
Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 990-91, 994
(1991) (Table 7).
31. See Richard Michael Fischl, Fear and Loathing on the Picket Line: Labor Law and the
Social Dimension of Workplace Protests (Oct. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
32. See Pope, supra note 28. This realization may provide fresh insight into E.P. Thompson's
famous and endlessly-cited passage on "the rule of law" and its role in social justice movements:
I am not starry-eyed about this at all. This has not been a star-struck book. I am
insisting only upon the obvious point, that there is a difference between arbitrary
power and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may
be concealed beneath this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective
inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizens from power's all-intrusive
claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny or belittle this good
is, in this dangerous century when the resources and pretentions of power continue
to enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual abstraction. More than this, it is a selffulfilling error, which encourages us to give up the struggle against bad laws and
class-bound procedures, and to disarm ourselves before power. It is to throw away a
whole inheritance of struggle about law, and within the forms of law, whose
continuity can never be fractured without bringing men and women into immediate
danger.
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975) (emphasis in
original). On the one hand, a body of important critical work published since Whigs and Hunters
has demonstrated that neither the notion of "arbitrary power" nor that of "the rule of law" fairly
captures the practice of legal decision making in at least one jurisdiction prominently associated
with the latter ideal; simply put, all the action lies somewhere in between. See, e.g., KENNEDY,
supra note II; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND (2001).
But if we shift focus from the first part of the paragraph to the last - from the broader claims about
the rule of law and its glories to Thompson's astute insights about the role of law-invocation and
law-critique in social justice movements - then what he says may resonate as profoundly for the
American labor movement as it does for early 18th century British foresters.
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of struggle and transgression. And accordingly those who work in the
labor law field - labor activists, their lawyers, and academics whose
work is sympathetic with labor's cause - may well find themselves relatively immune to the authority-fetishism that Pierre's work so astutely
33
challenges. (Look, Ma, no symptoms!)
Which is not to suggest that we have nothing to learn from Pierre,
for the practices and habits of legal academia are difficult to dislodge
without constant vigilance, self-consciousness, and self-critique - and
all that critical reflexivity can, as Pierre notes, turn a mind to mush.34
Indeed, there is obviously some tension between taking Pierre's critiques
seriously (on the one hand) and blithely continuing the conventional
practices of the legal academy (on the other). How can we purport to
admire the work of someone urging us to "lay down the law"' 35 - someone who is so boldly seeking to dethrone the law from its lofty perch in
our work - and continue to be Law Professors (in both senses of the
term)?
For many of us, that tension is a very real one, and in fact I had at
one point planned to open this Introduction with a narrative in the style
of a film noir voice-over (think Humphrey Bogart in "Dark Passage" or
Jack Webb of "Dragnet" fame): I live two lives, it would have begun.
By day, I'm a serious and self-respecting labor law professor issuing
solemn, carefully reasoned normative prescriptions to students, to colleagues, to judges, to legislatures . . . to the world. But in the dark of
night, alone and in the privacy of my study, I read Schlag. Devour his
every word. Revel in his rejection of legalism, of normativity, of reason,
of everything I hold dear. And this is my story. (You get the picture.)
But then I remembered: I don't live two lives.36 True enough, to
"read Schlag" is to become far more self-conscious about one's participation in the conventions of legal scholarship and indeed of legal argument and legal thinking more generally. When I write about (to take a
not quite random example) section 7 of the NLRA, it is now impossible
to cast it in a role that has it doing all the work - "commanding,"
33. To be sure, there's an ambiguity here, much as there was when Dean Calabresi originally
offered his cow-pox/small-pox account of the Yale faculty's resistance to cis during the latter's
heyday: Is the point that those who've been inoculated in this way just don't "get it," or is it that
they've "had it" all along? I have always assumed that Dean Calabresi meant the latter, and of
course that is my intended meaning as well, but Pierre and other readers may be less certain.
34. See SCHLAG, supra note 13, at 65.
35. See PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAw-MYSTIcIsM, FETISHISM AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996).

36. I also remembered that the last time I let my sense of irony out of its cage I found myself
blamed for the demise of cls. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the
Legal Academy, 51 J. LEGAL ED. 175, 179 & n.6 (2001) (mistaking irony for eulogy in the title of
The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies).
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"requiring," "prohibiting," "protecting," "suggesting," etc. - or at least
impossible to do so without a wink or some other form of rhetorical
distancing.37
More to the point, then, Pierre helps us remember what we already
know but all too easily repress or forget. In the context of a profession
in which argument mobilization is the coin of the realm - what do we do
most of the time but teach it, write about it, analyze it, take it apart, take
it seriously? - it is easy to lose sight of the fact that arguments seldom
change the world all by themselves.
To return briefly to the story that began this Introduction, I can now
see more clearly what I was up to when I developed the "widget hypothetical" all those years ago. When I was in law school, Duncan Kennedy made us read Robert Hale's work, and it just rocked my world.
For I thought I would be able to use it to prove to any fair-minded person patient enough to think it through that market capitalism requires as
much legal coercion as socialism - and thus that the question is not
whether the state should play a role in the economy but rather what role
it ought in fairness to play. I entered teaching some years later against
the backdrop of a growing body of work challenging the employment-atwill rule and urging increased legal protection for job security.38 The
widget hypothetical was my effort to bring Hale's insights to the debate
by demonstrating that the distribution of "ownership" rights in the workplace was a product of political choice and not simply "the nature of
things."
The hypo continues to provoke if not necessarily persuade;39 I'm
content with that, and besides it gave a young and untenured academic a
rare taste of fame. But what I was ignoring - indeed, what many of us
who were busy constructing powerful arguments for legally enforceable
job security had seemingly forgotten - was that American labor already
had the "ruby slippers." More accurately, labor had taken the ruby slippers by making job security a lived reality in many American work37. Compare, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and
Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789
(1989) (pre-Schlag) (in which section 7 sometimes appears to have a life of its own) with, e.g.,
Richard Michael Fischl, 'A domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run': Workplace
Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at-Will, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES, supra note 25, at 253 (post-Schlag) (in which

section 7 "does" things only ironically).
38. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, Protecting Employees At
Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983);
Gary Minda, Employment At-Will in the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 913 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan et al., TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR CASES AND MATERIALS ON

EMPLOYMENT LAW 5 (1993) (stating that the widget hypothetical "makes conservatives in the
class apoplectic").
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places. One would scarcely guess from arguments like the one I was
making back in 1987:
that American workers and their unions have played an important
historical role in the development of a world in which job security
has been a core value and in which conflicts over arbitrary dismissal
have been the central feature of labor relations; one would scarcely
guess that the protection (de facto as well as dejure) that many workers still enjoy is in no small measure the result of workplace struggles, of union organizing campaigns, of strikes supporting demands
made during collective bargaining, and of employers who have only
agreed to the so-called implicit contract [of career employment] as a
prophylactic against unionization. 4"
One could scarcely guess, in other words, that the battle to be won was
not merely a clash of legal arguments, but was instead - as my earlier
discussion of labor and law suggests - a struggle to be lived and
mounted in countless workplaces, in the streets, and in courtrooms as
well.
Which is not to say that arguments are nothing; they can sometimes
persuade a judge - or, eventually, a whole lot of judges; and, every once
in a while, large segments of the broader culture - to accept the justice
of one's cause. 4 As my colleague Patrick Gudridge notes, they may
also on occasion offer hints of opposition and dissent.4 2 But arguments
are not everything, a point that is all too often lost in the fray of argument construction and demolition in our daily professional lives.
Pierre's work serves as a vivid and powerful argument for remembering
that - an irony that he would appreciate, perhaps more than anyone else.
This Symposium is a tribute by a diverse group of critical scholars
to the work of a colleague who has rocked our world, and - whether
"inoculated" or not - the contributors have found much to admire, learn
from, and embrace in Pierre's scholarship. But my confreres pay Pierre
their greatest tribute by offering careful and in many instances highly
critical readings of the work, and - in the spirit of that tribute - I have
40. Fischl, Workplace Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at-Will, supra note 37, at 274
(criticizing a similar erasure of labor struggles in recent scholarly work suggesting that the
development of career employment during the 20th century - and the threats to it today - are the
product of economic forces and employer responses to them).
41. For the rare but important example of an argument that "had legs," see CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
(1979).
42. Patrick 0. Gudridge, Mit Schlag (Repetitions), 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 607, 628 (2003). For
an example of such an argument - and its interplay with considerable forces of rhetorical
assimilation - see Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7, supra note 37, at 854-58 (discussing Judge
Learned Hand's powerful depiction of labor solidarity in the famous Peter Cailler case).
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attempted to organize the essays around the critical themes that emerge
from their readings.
The essays in Part I of the Symposium - "Enchantment and Critique: If They're So Enchanted, Why Aren't They Smiling?" - offer a
series of perspectives on Pierre's argument that enchantment with reason
disables critical capacities with respect to law and legal thinking. The
authors agree that Pierre has identified a striking and important pattern
in mainstream American legal thought, but each of them identifies an
audience less in the thrall of enchantment than Pierre's analysis might be
read to suggest.
Susan Silbey and Patricia Ewick examine stories told by Americans
who are not lawyers, judges, or legal academics about their everyday
encounters with law and discover a lay legal consciousness that is equal
parts enchanted and disenchanted.43 Like Pierre, however, they offer an
assimilationist account and argue that the interplay of those contradictory understandings thwarts critique, rather than opening a space for it,
among "ordinary people."4 4 Duncan Kennedy takes on the very concept
of "the enchantment of reason," teasing out multiple meanings and finding some more persuasive than others.45 Duncan says that Pierre is right
about the lure of reason for scholars doing mainstream legal theory, but
concludes that the claim is overstated with respect to other legal professionals (including practitioners and academics doing doctrinal work) and
oblique to the plight of critical scholars who are already struggling with
the consequences of disenchantment.4 6 Joanne Conaghan likewise
observes that "some of us may be more enchanted than others," noting
in particular the work of feminist and critical race scholars who have
long been mounting their own battles with reason.4 7 In contrast to their
critiques, Joanne argues, Pierre focuses 'nigh exclusively on "the legal
conceptual regime" and very little on material practices; as a result,
"[t]he systematicity of reason's exclusionary tendencies, its role in constituting and reinforcing particularhierarchies, is simply not brought
into view."4' 8
The essays in Part II of the Symposium - "The Enchantment of Critique: Its Causes and Cure" - focus on Pierre's extraordinary capacity
43. Susan S. Silbey & Patricia Ewick, The Double Life of Reason and Law, 57 U. MIAMI L.
497 (2003).
44. Id. at 508-12.
45. Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513

REV.

(2003).
46. Id. at 535, 539-41.
47. Joanne Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U.
(emphasis in original).

48. Id. at 551.

MIAMI

L. REV. 543, 549 (2003)
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for identifying patterned oppositions and false dichotomies in American
legal thought but argue that, on occasion, Pierre may himself be enchanted by his patterns and grids. Jane Baron takes up Pierre's juxtaposition of "law" and "reason" (on the one hand) with "'authority, custom,
convention, force, power, experience, emotion, faith, dogma, and so
on"' (on the other) and finds a subtle privileging at work: "All of the[se]
latter qualities - until subdued by the flattening and enervating effects of
reason - have an authenticity, a reality, that Schlag never accords to
law." 4 9 What the juxtaposition and privileging may obscure, Jane
argues, is the law's role in the construction of those "realities" - and
thus the prospect of changing them by changing law." Jeremy Paul
identifies a different dichotomization with a similar effect: By treating
"reason" and "interest" as opposites, Pierre's work may miss an important connection between the two.5 1 Jeremy argues that it is precisely its
"link to self-interest that has made reason such a powerful tool in the
historic battle against the forces of power, authority, tradition, custom,
and so forth." 52 In the final essay in this Part, Patrick Gudridge examines the interplay of law and aesthetics portrayed in Pierre's most recent
article.5 3 Sympathetic with the larger project but critical of the particular portrayal - in which "modes of presentation impl[y] nothing at all
about the existence of underlying structures or processes, motivating historical triumphs of outrages, recurring socio-psychological needs or
warps, or the like" - Patrick analyzes a series of texts, legal and otherwise, in search of a "clashing politics" and "the hint, at least, of the
possibility of legal opposition. 5 4
The essays in Part III of the Symposium, "Reason's Empire," are
divided into two sections. The first - "Reason's History: Disciplinarity
and the Academy" - features contributions by James Hackney and Bert
Westbrook. James ties Pierre's critique of legal reason to parallel developments in philosophy and the history of science, noting the contemporary rejection of the "quest for certainty" that has traditionally
characterized work in all three fields.5 The histories he traces, he concludes, "illustrate the problematic nature of privileging any form of
knowledge, let alone legal theory, as holding out anything akin to abso49. Jane B. Baron, Romancing the Real, 57 U.
SCHLAG, supra note 13, at 40).
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573, 583-85 (2003) (quoting

50. Id. at 585-87.
51. Jeremy Paul, Beyond Reason and Interest, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 593 (2003).
52. Id. at 600.
53. Gudridge, supra note 42; the article he discusses is Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of
American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002).
54. Id. at 607-08, 628.
55. James R. Hackney, Jr., The "End" of: Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 57 U.
MiAmi L. REV. 629, 635 (2003).
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lute 'T'ruth."'5 6 Bert situates Pierre's work in the history of the University and its contemporary decline, and he argues that Pierre is an
academic "romantic" defending the classical view of the Academy
against modern incursions of ideology and interest.57 Bert argues that it
is Pierre who is enchanted by reason and thus critical of contemporary
legal thought because it "is not argument in pursuit of truth; it is argument in pursuit of power."58
In the second section - "Reason's Lure: The Enchantment of Subordination" - Anthony Farley and Kerry Rittich explore "the enchantment of reason" in specific social contexts. Anthony offers an extended
meditation on the guilty pleasures of racial domination and explores the
complex roles of law and reason in constructing racial hierarchies.59
"The power of interpretation," he argues, "divides masters from slaves,"
and he locates the "ecstasy of hierarchy" - for master and slave alike in the exercise of that power. 60 Kerry describes the strategic deployment
of "enchantment" in the law and development field, where "the rule of
law" is "'a new rallying cry for global missionaries.' ",61 The "missionaries," she explains, are the "good governance" advocates, who "use
arguments about law's reason and difference from politics, special interests, and the strictures of culture and tradition" in order to mask an
imperial agenda: "the continuation of politics by means of law, specifically, a politics that has become powerful enough to deny that it is
62
politics.
Following Part III, we take a break from the essays to present an
extraordinary piece in comic book form by Keith Aoki. 63 I won't try to

characterize Keith's contribution except to note that it provides a gentle
reminder to "normativos" - Pierre's name for legal academics who are
given to issuing Solemn Normative Prescriptions Designed to Change
the World - that in the end we are typically addressing only a room full
of students, however wonderful and talented those students may be.
During the "live" version of the Symposium, Keith presented an early
draft of the cartoon via overhead projector, and those of us unfamiliar
with the form were amazed to learn that the artwork, complete with
56. Id. at 648.
57. David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag and the Temple of Boredom, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV.
649 (2003).
58. Id. at 676-77.
59. Anthony Paul Farley, The Dream of Interpretation,57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (2003).

60. Id. at 689.
61. Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercionsof Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727, 728
(2003) (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 733.
63. Keith Aoki, P.IE.R.R.E. and the Agents of R.E.A.S.O.N., 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 743

(2003).
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speech balloons, was prepared before the story was complete and the
dialogue written - a vivid and perhaps not so accidental metaphor for
the invisible but very real constraints of form in our own work.
The essays in Part IV - "Law's Closet: Critique and the Critic" explore the psychodynamics of Pierre's relationship with the various
targets of his critique. In an "open letter" to Pierre, Maria Grahn-Farley
emphasizes a point touched on by other contributors as well: Why does
he focus exclusively on the work of "the white, senior, tenured, male
faculty within mainstream American law," and why doesn't he engage
with feminist and critical race scholars whose critiques of the mainstream have much in common with his?64 Maria portrays Pierre in a
complex relationship with the very "Dads" of the academy whose work
he challenges, suggesting that he may be fetishizing "'Dadhood"' even
as he critiques their work.6 5 Jeanne Schroeder and David Carlson argue
that, despite his unrelenting critique of normativity, Pierre has a normative agenda of his own: to eliminate the "distortions" of law and legal
thinking in order to liberate "the natural subject from whom completeness and authenticity have been unfairly denied by the legal bureaucracy."'66 Drawing on the work of Lacan, they concede that "the legal
subject is indeed 'castrated' by the law" - as they read Pierre to suggest
- but argue that "this very castration . is the condition of possibility
for the actualization of freedom." 67
Peter Goodrich shifts the focus to Pierre's critics and suggests that
their "vehemen[ce]" is a reaction to Pierre's effort to "out" them - that
is, a reaction to his "attempt to confront the legal academy with desires
that it cannot name, with insights that it excludes, with the material supports of its abstract and often unthinking norms. 6 8 Peter observes that
Pierre's critique of normativity has drawn particular fire for its failure to
advocate an alternative, locating that response in status anxiety: "It is not
enough, in other words, that Schlag has his own project; he needs to
prescribe a project for others and then the new program can substitute
for the old, a new order can provide the criteria of excellence that will
underpin the hierarchy that will determine who we will become. "' 6
64. Maria Grahn-Farley, An Open Letter to Pierre Schlag, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 755, 761
(2003); to the same effect, see Conaghan, supra note 47, at 546. Duncan Kennedy and Peter
Goodrich make a similar point, noting Pierre's tendency to write as if he were all alone in
critiquing the mainstream jurisprudential tradition. See Kennedy, supra note 45, at 515; Goodrich,
supra note 14, at 807 n.54.

65. Grahn-Farley, supra note 64, at 763.
66. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Law's Non-Existent Empire, 57 U.
767, 770 (2003) (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 771.
68. Goodrich, supra note 14, at 794.
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Tackling related themes, Tamara Piety attributes the "strong emotions"
evident in responses to Pierre's work to the critics' "obsess[ion] with
rightness" and the threat posed by Pierre's argument that their beloved
reason "is not always right."7 ° Tamara argues that such critics are overreading Pierre; in her view, his work is less a rejection of reason writ
large than a refreshing challenge to "the empty rituals" and "false
pieties" of much legal scholarship.7 '
Questions about what a post-Pierre "project" would look like preoccupied a number of the participants as they asked, with varying
degrees of irony, what ought to be put in the place of the professional
practices that Pierre so astutely critiques. That is what someone once
identified as "the question that killed critical legal studies" and hence the
title of the fifth and final part of the Symposium: "The Return of the
Killer Question: Where Do We Go From Here?"
The essays here are divided into two sections. In the first - "Taking Schlag to (the) Task: Reconstructing Rights, Reason, and Politics" the contributors examine the significance of Pierre's insights for the role
of law and legal thinking in the quest for social justice. Emphasizing
Pierre's acknowledgement that his theories might not have extra-territorial application because "'[t]he social and intellectual contexts in which
law and legal thought is produced in other countries [are] likely to differ
and to require different analysis,'" Dennis Davis takes issue with the
absence of social contextualism in the local critiques that Pierre does
offer, "as if [such] concerns may apply elsewhere but not in his own
backyard."7 " In particular, Dennis suggests that this absence might
undermine Pierre's critique of "the casting of political struggles in the
idiom of 'rights' "; drawing on the example of current efforts in South
Africa to deal with the ravages of HIV, Dennis argues that "rights talk"
can play a vital and salutary role in struggles for social justice.7 3 Maria
Grahn-Farley offers a different perspective on the utility of "rights" in
such struggles." Focusing on the rights of children, she takes Pierre's
critique as a point of departure but brings to the task the attention to
particularities of context that Dennis found lacking; the result, contra
Dennis, is a trenchant critique of the ways in which rights analysis rein70. Tamara R. Piety, Smoking in Bed, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 828, 836 (2003).
71. Id. at 828.
72. The Honorable Dennis M. Davis, Dissonance Orientation: The Occupational Hazard of
Being a Judge or a Requirement for the Job?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 853, 855 (2003) (quoting

supra note 13, at 14).
73. Id. at 855, 860-64.

SCHLAG,

74. Maria Grahn-Farley, A Theory of Child Rights, 57 U.
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forces both the "master norm" of "white adult male hegemony" and the
subordination of others to that norm.75 Finally, taking up themes raised
in Maria's open letter7 6 and also in Joanne Conaghan's essay,7 7 Daria
Roithmayr notes Pierre's "fail[ure] to consider the way in which the ideology of reason structures racial and gendered power," but adds that his
critique of reason likewise neglects a silver lining - i.e., "that women
and people of color might be able to use the ideology of reason to resist
racial and gendered power."7 8 Daria attempts to sketch a "radical pragmatism" that resists reason's imperial and universalizing tendencies by
avoiding questions like "What is true?" and focusing instead on "what
works" for particular disempowered communities "in the current political, social, economic and legal climate. 7 9
In the second section - "Taking Schlag Seriously: Practices in the
Legal Academy" - the contributors reconsider academic practices in the
light of Pierre's critiques. The first two essays, by Jack Schlegel and
Phyllis Goldfarb, outline strategies for making our teaching and writing
more relevant to the work our students do when we're finished with
them. Jack argues for a shift in our focus from the normative practices
Pierre critiques to empirical social inquiry.8" The failure of normative
legal thought to engage in any serious way with the world of law our
students actually face, he argues, "guarantees that the gap between the
ideal and the actual in legal behavior will be closed infinitesimally, if at
all, and will instead perpetuate an asserted problem in the guise of solving it, supporting the continuing employment of law professors, I suppose, but not otherwise being effective."8 1 Phyllis proposes a "Pierre
Schlag Postmodern Legal Clinic" that might avoid many of the shortcomings of current normative training: "When released from the controlling grip of the law professor's law," she argues, "the legitimation that
can come from the appearance of employing reason by applying doctrine
through a legal ritual to a person charged with a crime is far less effective when the student-attorney, through identification with a client, can
see the suffering that the system both ignores and produces."82 Phyllis
argues that the lessons thus gained from the experience of "doing law"
75. Id. at 912-14.
76. Grahn-Farley, supra note 64, at 762.
77. Conaghan, supra note 47, at 551.
78. Daria Roithmayr, "Easy for You to Say": An Essay on Outsiders, the Usefulness of
Reason, and Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939, 940-41 (2003) (emphasis added).

79. Id. at 948.
80. John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre,If We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We To Do?,
57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955 (2003).
81. Id. at 968.
82. Phyllis Goldfarb, Picking Up the Law, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 979-80 (2003)
(footnotes omitted).
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might also represent a "cure" for the enchantment of reason, "contradict[ing] Pierre's assertion that it is impossible to do law without participating in law's illusions, without taking up its metaphysics." 83
Fran Olsen provides the third essay in this section and applies
Pierre's critiques to an academic project of her own: a lecture she gave
at a conference in Israel on Women and Peace. 84 In this unusually transparent exercise of what Pierre refers to as "critical reflexivity, 8 5 Fran
examines her lecture - an exploration of the connection between peace
and antidiscrimination activism in Israel, with a particular focus on the
role of women - to see whether and to what extent she too has succumbed to reason's "enchantment." 86 In the fourth and final essay, Debbie Maranville considers whether enchantment is such a bad thing after
all.8 7 Taking her cue from Pierre's charge that reason's partisans are
engaged not in a reasoned enterprise but rather in "'magical thinking'"
and "consensual make-believe," she offers an extended mediation on the
role of fantasy - for good and for ill - in our own lives and in the life of
the law.8 8
Pierre, of course, gets the last word, and, in deference to that, I shall
resist the considerable temptations of formal symmetry and let his contribution speak all for itself.8 9 But I do want to offer an observation on a
point he makes in response to the participants who have called on him to
plight his troth with feminist, critical race theorists, and other critical
scholars. 9° "As I see it," he observes, "part of being an intellectual is
having your own projects, your own intellectual agenda, your own sense
of what to do - as opposed to simply following the default institutional
paths laid out for you." 9 ' As most of these essays acknowledge, there is
no scholar more astute at mapping "those default institutional paths" and identifying the stultifying intellectual and moral consequences of
taking them - than Pierre. But I disagree that "following" those paths
and "having your own intellectual agenda" are the only choices available
to critical scholars.
83. Id. at 982 (footnotes omitted).
84. Frances Olsen, Peace, Civil Disobedience, and Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical
Appraisal of Reason and Politics, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989 (2003).
85. SCHLAG, supra note 13, at 63-64.
86. Olsen, supra note 84, at 1002-06.
87. Deborah Maranville, Building a Better Sand Castle: Fantasy, Growth, and the
Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1007 (2003).
88. Id. at 1009-10 (quoting SC-LAG, supra note 13, at 108-09).
89. Pierre Schlag, A Reply-The Missing Portion, 57 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1029 (2003).
90. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91. Schlag, supra note 88, at 1030 (emphases added).
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In any other context, Pierre would be the first to spot the selfdirected autonomous subject rearing his (yes, his) head here, erasing
community and context. Surely it is possible to acknowledge and even
celebrate one's location in a community of critical scholars - from the
Realists on whose work we continue to build to contemporaries who
greatly value one's work even as they critique it - and at the same time
to maintain the integrity of the positions we take, to take responsibility
for scholarly choices, to do original and pathbreaking work, and to
worry a little less about the "own" part. As this Symposium eloquently
attests, there is "much to give and much to gain."92

92. Grahn-Farley, supra note 64, at 765.
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